Indonesia, as a country with rich diversity, faces a significant challenge in the form of polarisation, which occurs not only in the political sphere but also in religion and belief. In the context of Christian theological education in Indonesia, polarisation also occurs between conservative and liberal views. Conservatives adhere to literal interpretations and established doctrines, while liberals are more flexible and open to contextual interpretations. To address this polarisation, an approach that transcends both extremes is needed. This article proposes post-conservative (...) thought as a conceptual solution for theological education in Indonesia. Postconservatism positions itself in the middle between conservative and liberal, recognising the importance of fundamental principles of faith while also being open to change and dialogue. This article employs a literature review method to analyse and develop a theoretical framework supporting the application of post-conservatism in Christian theological education in Indonesia. The analysis shows that postconservative theological education needs to be transformative, constructive-creative and liberating to break down polarisation and create inclusive, relevant and impactful education for society.Contribution: This study helps in integrating postconservative theology within theological education, fostering a more nuanced and transformative approach to interpreting Scriptures and addressing ethical and social issues. Interdisciplinary implications involve collaboration with social sciences, education, peace studies and health sciences to develop comprehensive strategies for community engagement, conflict resolution and holistic well-being. (shrink)

During recovery from psychosis (diagnosed as schizophrenia) things must often be done slower than normally expected. The tempo of the socially shared reality is often experienced as being too fast for the recovering person. We will describe how this impairment stems from the pre-reflective mental structure underlying psychosis and how it can be transferred into an active skill supporting recovery, often including social retreat. In this paper, co-written by a psychiatrist and a person experienced in psychosis (= participatory health research), (...) we will draw on personal experiences, (participatory) qualitative research and first-hand accounts for our arguments. We will sketch out the process and three crucial building blocks of recovery: laid-back situations, switch-off skills, places to talk. We will then describe the acquired skill of slowing-down as an amalgam of the building blocks ‘switch-off skill’ and ‘laid-back situation’, since slowing-down answers the situation in a laid-back manner and enforces a slow behavioral pace on it. While this might be okay in private and in some situations shared with others (i.e. during serene situations), it may be tantalizing for others in many everyday situations resulting in stigma or exclusion (i.e. during work). Slowing-down therefore challenges the surrounding others and demonstrates the necessity to synchronize private and public tempos. This is most challenging while living in two realities at once, being the second and often a long-lasting stage of recovery (stage of double realities). (shrink)

In this article, I focus on possibly impaired self-determination in addiction. After some methodological reflections, I introduce a phenomenological description of the experience of being self-determined. I argue that being self-determined implies effectivity of agency regarding three different behavioural domains. Such self-referential agency shall be called ‘self-effectivity’ in this article. In a second step, I will use this phenomenological description to understand the impairments of self-determination in addiction. While addiction does not necessarily imply a basic lack of control over one’s (...) life, this can well be the case during certain periods of time or in special situations. Addiction is herein described as an embodied custom—highly effective with respect to changing one’s lived experience—which is learned and developed while becoming addicted. Such a repeatedly performed custom, called a ‘psychotropic technique’, implies deep changes in one’s personal identity and alters an agent’s ‘self-effectivity’. In the closing section, I discuss the possible implications of a phenomenological approach to personal responsibility. (shrink)

Understanding the mental life of persons with psychosis/schizophrenia has been the crucial challenge of psychiatry since its origins, both for scientific models as well as for every therapeutic encounter between persons with and without psychosis/schizophrenia. Nonetheless, a preliminary understanding is always the first step of phenomenological as well as other qualitative research methods addressing persons with psychotic experiences in their life-world. In contrast to Rashed's assertions, in order to achieve such understanding, phenomenological psychopathologists need not necessarily adopt the transcendental-phenomenological attitude, (...) which, however, is often required if performing phenomenological philosophy. Additionally, in the course of these scientific endeavors, differences between persons with psychosis/schizophrenia and so-called normal people seem to have a methodological function and value driving the scientist in her enterprise. Yet, these differences do not extend to ethical dimensions, and therefore, do not by any means touch ethical equality. (shrink)

In this paper phenomenological descriptions of the experiential structures of suicidality and of self-determined behaviour are given; an understanding of the possible scopes and forms of lived self-determination in suicidal mental life is offered. Two possible limits of lived self-determination are described: suicide is always experienced as minimally self-determined, because it is the last active and effective behaviour, even in blackest despair; suicide can never be experienced as fully self-determined, even if valued as the authentic thing to do, because no (...) retrospective re-evaluation from some future vantage is possible. The phenomenological descriptions of the possible scope of lived self-determination in suicidality, presented in this paper, should prove to be extremely helpful in three different fields of interest: (a) ethical debates regarding the pros and cons of autonomous or heteronomous suicide; (b) clinical day-to-day practice with respect to treating suicidal people; (c) people who suffered a suicidal crisis, attempted suicide or lost loved ones through suicides. (155 words). (shrink)

In this paper, I develop a phenomenological description of lived autonomy and describe possible alterations of lived autonomy associated with chronic depression as they relate to specific psychopathological symptoms. I will distinguish between two types of lived autonomy, a pre-reflective type and a reflective type, which differ with respect to the explicitness of the action that is willed into existence; and I will relate these types to the classical distinction between freedom of intentional action and freedom of the will. I (...) will then describe how a chronically depressed person habitually discloses her experiential workspace with an impaired scope of perceivable action-properties, and pre-reflectively values many of these perceived action-properties as demanding or devalues these properties as well as her own abilities and drive to perform the respective actions. These alterations, typically experienced in a passive manner, imply an impairment of both types of lived autonomy. Drawing on first-hand accounts, I will then argue that small islands of lived autonomy, even of the reflective type, are possible if the afflicted identifies with at least some of her ‘depressive disabilities’. Lastly, I will compare this manner of life-conduct with the constellation of includence, as described by Tellenbach, and discuss the limitations of this study. (shrink)

In this paper the question of autonomy in delusional disorders is investigated using a phenomenological approach. I refer to the distinction between freedom of intentional action, and freedom of the will, and develop phenomenological descriptions of lived autonomy, taking into account the distinction between a pre-reflective and a reflective type. Drawing on a case report, I deliver finely-grained phenomenological descriptions of lived autonomy and experienced self-determination when acting on delusions. This analysis seeks to demonstrate that a person with delusions can (...) be described as responsible for her behaviour on a ‘framed’ level (level of freedom of intentional action), even though she is not autonomous on a higher (‘framing’) level (level of freedom of the will), if, and only if, the goods of agency for herself and others are respected. In these cases the person with delusions is very nearly comparable to people in love, who are also not free to choose their convictions, and who could also be rightly held responsible for the behaviour flowing from their convictions. (shrink)

Phenomenological descriptions of depressed mental life offer a profound understanding of depression from the first-person perspective. In this paper, such descriptions are developed by drawing on the work by Ludwig Binswanger and on the autobiographical report of depression by Piet C. Kuiper . I will argue that Binswanger’s central claim in his phenomenological description of the depressed state of mind fails due to crucial misunderstandings of Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology. Nonetheless, by drawing on Kuiper’s first-hand account, I will develop a phenomenological (...) description of depressed mental life, highlighting the altered manner of pre-reflective valuing in depression and introducing the concept of a ‘depressive habituality.’ This term refers to the acquisition of a new set of habitualisations, especially on the foundational levels of automatic mental life. It offers explanations for the fact that it is not easy to recover from depression and that people may more easily become depressed again. (shrink)

This book aims to contribute to our understanding of one of the most pressing issues of modern international law: the relationship between the international legal order on the one hand and the domestic legal orders of over 190 sovereign states on the other handThe traditional and dominant understanding of this relationship is that there exists a strict separation between the international legal order and domestic legal orders. Processes of legal globalisation and internationalisation have made this relationship much more complex. Legal (...) authority has shifted away from the state in both vertical and horizontal directions. Forced by the pressures of interdependence, states have allowed international bodies to oversee and sometimes even implement and enforce domestic legislation. At the same time, private persons are more and more drawn into an internationalized order. Increasing cross-border flows of services, goods and capital, mobility, and communication have further undermined any stable notion of what is national and what is international.This book offers several partly complementary and partly competing perspectives that allow us understand and make sense of the complex interaction between the international and domestic sphere. (shrink)

The Cambridge Companion to Grotius offers a comprehensive overview of Hugo Grotius for students, teachers, and general readers, while its chapters also draw upon and contribute to recent specialised discussions of Grotius' oeuvre and its later reception. Contributors to this volume cover the width and breadth of Grotius' work and thought, ranging from his literary work, including his historical, theological and political writing, to his seminal legal interventions. While giving these various fields a separate treatment, the book also delves into (...) the underlying conceptions and outlooks that formed Grotius' intellectual map of the world as he understood it, and as he wanted it to become, giving a new political and religious context to his forays into international and domestic law. (shrink)

In this paper I investigate the topic of paranoid atmospheres. This subject is especially of interest with respect to persons who are deluded, and also, I will demonstrate, sheds light upon the psychiatrist's "gaze" and knowledge of delusions. In my argument I will follow a path initially outlined by Karl Jaspers (1883-1969): modern psychiatric diagnosis of delusions is a diagnosis of form and not content. Jaspers' emphasis on the form of delusions enables psychiatrists to be self-critical about their professional knowledge (...) and, consequently, prevent the development of dogmatic attitudes. In accord with Jaspers, my argument will focus on the basic structure of delusions and highlight the difference between delusional realities and non-delusional realities, a difference that follows from the possibility of self-criticism of one's own conscious and explicit convictions. I will demonstrate the importance of self-criticism with regard to paranoid atmospheres and also to psychiatric knowledge. In this manner, an understanding of delusions as lived experience will be developed, which argues that an escalation of the influence of delusional convictions, resulting in a profoundly paranoid atmosphere, is most problematic for the deluded person. To acknowledge this insight mirrors the need for a self-critique of psychiatric discourse, encourages an empathic and respectful relationship between professionals and deluded patients, and enables deluded persons to restrict their paranoid atmosphere. It is the main conclusion of my paper that a deluded person cannot do (with respect to his delusional convictions) what a psychiatrist must do (with respect to his psychiatric knowledge and his own existential convictions) in order to prevent a profoundly paranoid atmosphere in their relationship: be self-critical. (shrink)

In this article, we present two accounts of intersubjectivity in Jaspers and Husserl, respectively. We argue that both can be brought together for a more satisfying account of empathy and communication in the context of psychiatric praxis. But while we restrict ourselves for the most part to this praxis, we also indicate the larger agenda that drives Jaspers and Husserl, despite all disagreement. Here we spell out, in particular, how a phenomenologically inspired account of empathy and intersubjectivity can have larger (...) ramifications for a theory of social life and interaction. Finally, we argue for a ‘relaxed' view concerning the relation between pure and applied phenomenology, such that both can mutually benefit from one another. (shrink)

This is an essay based on a story with observations, about present and sparkling moments from everyday life coexisting with a mother living with dementia. The story is used to begin philosophical underpinnings reflecting on ‘how it could be otherwise’. Dementia deploys brutal existential experiences such as cognitive deterioration, decline in mental functioning and often hurtful social judgements. The person living with dementia goes through transformation and changes of self. Cognitive decline progressively disrupts the foundations upon which social connectedness is (...) built, often creating a profound sense of insecurity. The challenge for carers and healthcare professionals is therefore to find ways of clarifying a concept of agency. It will be worthwhile developing the ability of attuning into ‘what is there’ arising from every corner of the care situation. Understanding and practicing this can strengthen existence and the experience of connectedness and meaning, empowering the person with dementia. It is important to find ways, relational moves, in which carers and healthcare professionals can embed the creativity appearing in mundane everyday situations filled with surplus of meaning, sharing mental landscapes (and embodied relational understanding) with the person living with dementia – seizing and sharing aesthetic moments (verbal and nonverbal) being present together. We argue that carers and healthcare professionals may find this understanding of care useful. This implies looking into a phenomenological‐hermeneutic perspective developing competences as well as practical wisdom understanding and being aware of the creative and innovative possibilities (often preverbal and unnoticed small things) in everyday life of what we, inspired by psychoanalyst Daniel Stern, call sparkling moments of meeting, creating experience with the other that is personally undergone and lived through in the present. (shrink)

Let random vectors \ represent joint measurements of certain subsets \ of properties\ in different contexts\. Such a system is traditionally called noncontextual if there exists a jointly distributed set \ of random variables such that \ has the same distribution as \ for all \ A trivial necessary condition for noncontextuality and a precondition for many measures of contextuality is that the system is consistently connected, i.e., all \ measuring the same property \ have the same distribution. The contextuality-by-default (...) approach allows defining more general measures of contextuality that apply to inconsistently connected systems as well, but at the price of a higher computational cost. In this paper we propose a novel measure of contextuality that shares the generality of the CbD approach and the computational benefits of the previously proposed negative probability approach. The present approach differs from CbD in that instead of considering all possible joints of the double-indexed random variables \, it considers all possible approximating single-indexed systems \. The degree of contextuality is defined based on the minimum possible probabilistic distance of the actual measurements \ from \. We show that this measure, called the optimal approximation measure, agrees with a certain measure of contextuality of the CbD approach for all systems where each property enters in exactly two contexts. The OA measure can be calculated far more efficiently than the CbD measure and even more efficiently than the NP measure for sufficiently large systems. We also define a variant, the OA-NP measure of contextuality that agrees with the NP measure for consistently connected systems while extending it to inconsistently connected systems. (shrink)

Person‐specific evidence was developed as a grounded theory by analyzing 20 selected case descriptions from interventions using the guided self‐determination method with people with various long‐term health conditions. It explains the mechanisms of mobilizing relational capacity by including person‐specific evidence in shared decision‐making. Person‐specific self‐insight was the first step, achieved as individuals completed reflection sheets enabling them to clarify their personal values and identify actions or omissions related to self‐management challenges. This step paved the way for sharing these insights and (...) challenges in a relationship with a supportive health professional, who could then rely on person‐specific evidence instead of assumptions or a narrow disease perspective for shared decision‐making. Trust in the evidence encouraged the supportive health professional to transfer it to the interdisciplinary team. Person‐specific evidence then enhanced the ability of team members to apply general evidence in a meaningful way. The increased openness achieved by individuals through these steps enabled them to eventually share their new self‐insights in daily life with other people, decreasing loneliness they experienced in self‐management. Relational capacity, the core of the theory, is mobilized in both people with long‐term health conditions and healthcare professionals. Further research on person‐specific evidence and relational capacity in healthcare is recommended. (shrink)

Correlations of spins in a system of entangled particles are inconsistent with Kolmogorov’s probability theory (KPT), provided the system is assumed to be non-contextual. In the Alice–Bob EPR paradigm, non-contextuality means that the identity of Alice’s spin (i.e., the probability space on which it is defined as a random variable) is determined only by the axis $\alpha _{i}$ chosen by Alice, irrespective of Bob’s axis $\beta _{j}$ (and vice versa). Here, we study contextual KPT models, with two properties: (1) Alice’s (...) and Bob’s spins are identified as $A_{ij}$ and $B_{ij}$ , even though their distributions are determined by, respectively, $\alpha _{i}$ alone and $\beta _{j}$ alone, in accordance with the no-signaling requirement; and (2) the joint distributions of the spins $A_{ij},B_{ij}$ across all values of $\alpha _{i},\beta _{j}$ are constrained by fixing distributions of some subsets thereof. Of special interest among these subsets is the set of probabilistic connections, defined as the pairs $\left( A_{ij},A_{ij'}\right) $ and $\left( B_{ij},B_{i'j}\right) $ with $\alpha _{i}\not =\alpha _{i'}$ and $\beta _{j}\not =\beta _{j'}$ (the non-contextuality assumption is obtained as a special case of connections, with zero probabilities of $A_{ij}\not =A_{ij'}$ and $B_{ij}\not =B_{i'j}$ ). Thus, one can achieve a complete KPT characterization of the Bell-type inequalities, or Tsirelson’s inequalities, by specifying the distributions of probabilistic connections compatible with those and only those spin pairs $\left( A_{ij},B_{ij}\right) $ that are subject to these inequalities. We show, however, that quantum-mechanical (QM) constraints are special. No-forcing theorem says that if a set of probabilistic connections is not compatible with correlations violating QM, then it is compatible only with the classical–mechanical correlations. No-matching theorem says that there are no subsets of the spin variables $A_{ij},B_{ij}$ whose distributions can be fixed to be compatible with and only with QM-compliant correlations. (shrink)

Observational indications combined with analyses of analogue and emergent gravity in condensed matter systems support the possibility that there might be two distinct energy scales related to quantum gravity: the scale that sets the onset of quantum gravitational effects $E_{\rm B}$ (related to the Planck scale) and the much higher scale $E_{\rm L}$ signalling the breaking of Lorentz symmetry. We suggest a natural interpretation for these two scales: $E_{\rm L}$ is the energy scale below which a special relativistic spacetime emerges, (...) $E_{\rm B}$ is the scale below which this spacetime geometry becomes curved. This implies that the first ‘quantum’ gravitational effect around $E_{\rm B}$ could simply be that gravity is progressively switched off, leaving an effective Minkowski quantum field theory up to much higher energies of the order of $E_{\rm L}$ . This scenario may have important consequences for gravitational collapse, inasmuch as it opens up new possibilities for the final state of stellar collapse other than an evaporating black hole. (shrink)

This pre-registered replication study explores the impact of perceived cuteness on the evolution of cultural artifacts, testing whether neotenic traits – eye size, forehead height, and head roundness – have increased in teddy bears over time. In previous research, Hinde & Barden (1980) found an increase in teddy bear neoteny while Gould (1985) found that Mickey Mouse’s features became more neotenic with time. However, both studies lacked statistical power (15 teddy bears and 3 Mickey Mouse drawings). We collected data from (...) eight major teddy bear manufacturers over nine decades (N = 250; 1900–1980). We found that the forehead height of teddy bears significantly increased over time. Conversely, our prediction that heads became rounder and eyes became bigger were not supported. We outline four key methodological limitations that future research should address to deepen our understanding of the cultural evolution of cuteness and of cultural artifacts more broadly – i.e., sampling bias, metadata inaccuracy, categorization ambiguity, and function ambiguity. (shrink)

The paper considers the recently published British Medical Association Guidance on ethical issues arising in relation to rationing of treatment during the COVID-19 Pandemic. It considers whether it...

David Ricardo was a hugely influential British political economist and stock trader. This volume, first published in 1923, contains five important pamphlets published by him, edited and with an overarching introductory essay by E. C. K. Gonner. Each essay relates either to monetary and financial subjects - including the high price of Bullion, monetary theory and the position of the Bank of England - or to the agricultural conditions of Britain and proposed solutions to the problems discussed. This is a (...) fascinating and detailed work, which will be of great value to those with an interest in Ricardo’s theories and British economic history. (shrink)

Tsc question of the date of Ctesibius has been much obscured of late years by those German scholars1 who assert that Ctesibius the pneumatic and hydraulic engineer mentioned by Vitruvius IX. 8. 2 is distinct and separate from Κτησίβιος Κτησίβιος μηΧανικός who is mentioned by Athenaeus Mechanicus , Philo of Byzantium , and Hedylus ap. Athenaeum Naucratitam Deipn. XI., p. 497, d-e = Anthologia Graeca ed. Cougny, Paris , 1890, Vol. III., p. 298, n. 67.

The crisis of western civilization is a crisis of public philosophy. This is the charge of Public Philosophy and Political Science, a stunning new collection of essays edited by E. Robert Statham Jr. Vividly cataloging the decay of the moral and intellectual foundations of civic liberty, the book portrays a generation of Americans alienated from institutions built on public philosophy. The work exposes the failure of America's political scientists to acknowledge and understand this alarming crisis in the American body politic. (...) The distinguished contributors examine the evolution of public philosophy; the inextricable relationship between politics and philosophy; and the interplay between public philosophy, the constitution, natural law, and government. They reveal the dire threat to deliberative democracy and the fundamental order of constitutional society posed by public philosophy's waning power to refine, cultivate, and civilize. The work is an indictment of a society which has discarded a way of life rooted in natural law, democracy and the traditions of civility; and is a denunciation of an educated elite that has divorced itself from the standards upon which public philosophy rests. It is essential reading for philosophers and political and social scientists seeking to resurrect the standards of American public life. (shrink)

Can there be such a thing as moral science, or a science of morality? And if so, what sense has the word science in such a connection? In the middle of the last century such a question would probably have seemed superfluous. Utilitarians, Comtists, and not a few “evolutionists” would all have claimed to be moralists, with this advantage over the metaphysical or theological moralists of an earlier day that their own moral doctrines were “scientific”.